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Labor force decision to migrate
Elvio Accinelli Edgar J. S. Carreray Osvaldo Salasz
October 26, 2011
Abstract
This paper works on the idea that migration is explained as the result of an imitation process. So,
we develop a suitable model for the study of migration driven by imitative behavior, i.e. migrate if
the others are doing. We show that there exists a threshold value for the impact of emigration in the
birth country and in the host country. Finally, we o¤er some elements of economic policy to avoid the
negative externalities that migration may cause.
Keywords: Harris-Todaro model; Migrant behavior; Production complementarity; Replicator dynamics; Social
welfare.
JEL Classication: C72, F22, O3, R1.
1 Introduction
Recall the classical theoretical point of view that the disparities of wages is the driving force encouraging
migration processes, between rural and urban areas to study the migration between countries. This point
of view can be modied in a number of ways to introduce many interesting aspects (risk aversion, priority
hiring, travel costs, etc,...), in our case it is imitation as a cultural behavior to obtain a better understanding
of this phenomena. At least to some extent migration behavior is the outcome of an imitative behavior:
migrate if the others do it. Preferences of individuals are conformed in a community, and preferences
determine the behavior of each individual. Our departure point is that at least to some extent migrant
behavior is the outcome of a imitative behavior in a given community and time, (push factor). We claim
that preferences for migration are formed largely by imitating the behavior of individuals who are nearby or
in the same network. In one community or in a network, at a given time, individuals may have preferences
in favor or against the migration and distribution of these preferences, largely determine the response of
individuals in this community with respect to the alternative: to migrate or not migrate." In particular
we claim that the decision to migrate depends on two factors, the economic factor, in particular the wage
di¤erentials (pull factors), but also on the existing population distribution among individuals for or against
the migration (push factors).
The study of migration in general and rural-urban migration in particular has for long been an important
area of research in development economics. In this study the theoretical works of of Todaro (1969) and
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Harris-Todaro (1970), have been particularly important. The Harris-Todaro model, named after John R.
Harris and Michael Todaro, is an economic model used in development economics and welfare economics
to explain some of the issues concerning rural-urban migration. The main assumption of the model is that
the migration decision is based on expected income di¤erentials between rural and urban areas rather than
just wage di¤erentials. This implies that rural-urban migration in a context of high urban unemployment
can be economically rational if expected urban income exceeds expected rural income.
In our paper we attempt to extend this model to the case of the migration between countries. We
introduce the imitation as a main factor to enhance or slow the migration decision. We consider that
potential migrants indeed respond to the expected income di¤erentials between countries and so migration
is primarily an economic phenomenon. However, considering imitation as a factor encouraging or not
migration, we introduce the network or the community that surrounds the individual as an important
factor in the individual decision of migrates or does not. This generalization of the Harris-Todaro model
can be considered as an important tool to understand how an increase in employment in a given country,
the host country, may actually result in higher levels of unemployment and even in lost of social welfare in
such country. In the economic literature, the main variable that a¤ects the migration decision is the wage
di¤erential between the host country and the country of origin (Todaro, 1969; Langley, 1974; Hart, 1975;
Borjas, 1990, 1994). Nevertheless, even if the wage di¤erential is important, it is not su¢ cient to totally
explain migrant behaviour. Evidence seems to stress the focal role of community networks in the migrants
choice (Boyd, 1989; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Winters et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2002; Coniglio,
2003; Munshi, 2001, 2003; Heitmueller, 2003). Moretti (1999), for example, with an alternative model to
Todaros, found evidence that both the timing and the destination of migration could be explained by the
presence of social networks in the host country.
The economic e¤ects of migration vary widely. Sending countries may experience both gains and losses
in the short term but may stand to gain over the longer term. For receiving countries temporary programs
help to address skills shortages but may decrease domestic wages and add to public welfare burden, however
the migration of skilled workers have strong an immediate e¤ects on the welfare of both the sender and the
receiving countries.
As it is widely accepted in the recent literature, the complementarity between R&D and human capital
accumulation is widely accepted as an engine of sustained growth. In this fashion, two theories have to
be considered. The rst one, more conventional, is the "Skill-biased Technological Change" (see papers by
Berman et al., 1994 in the US, Haskel and Heden, 1999 in the UK, and Machin and Van Reenen, 1998
extending to the continental Europe) where the investments in R&D, new products, new process, new
technologies - even the ICTs, Information and Communication Technologies - increase the rmsdemand
for skilled workers, assuming they better know how to implement the new technologies (see the "absorptive
capacity" by Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p.131 where "an organizations absorptive capacity will depend
on the absorptive capacities of its individual members"). In this framework, skilled labor is a necessary
complement to R&D activities in reinforcing the absorptive capacity of a given organization and new
technologies become more e¤ective. The second theory supports the endogeneity of the phenomenon, i.e.
the endogenous skill-bias which suggests that skilled workers are responsible for inducing investments in
new technologies in rms (see Kiley, 1999; Funk and Vogel, 2004).
Following Accinelli-Carrera (2011), we consider imitation plays a main role in the behavior followed by
workers and rms. When the information is no complete, largely the behavior of the individual economics
agents is inspired by the behavior of their respective networks. The role of the imitation is played not only
in the decision to migrate or does not, also in the decision of worker between to be skilled or not, and in
the decision of rms to be innovative or not. With respect to innovative rms, it is considered that "a rm
decides to be innovative investing in R&D, if the number of high-skilled workers is large enough." This is
an issue, since innovation is the most risky investment of all, so it cannot be taken as granted that a rm
investing in R&D is going to be innovative in terms of innovative output. R&D is an innovative input, but
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innovative results come through a knowledge production function which is still under study. So we consider
that a rm invest in such a risky and uncertain activity, such as R&D, only looking at the skill-composition
of the work-force in the overall economy (at least, looking at it in a specic sector/industry). This is surely
a relevant element, but not the only one, especially when the information is not complete. The workers
decision on to be or does not skilled, depends on their expectative on salaries, to be skilled is a good decision
if and only if the expectative to be engaged by a innovative rm is high. Innovative rms are the only that
pay the opportunity cost of education.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model as a two-stage game about
the decision to migrate or not depending on expected payo¤s. Section 3 develops the replicator dynamic
equation to migrate while section 4 works on the imitation process on it. Subsection 4.1 shows the main
results of the paper. Section 5 explains economic policies of our model. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The burden of the Todaro model was to explain why masses of workers moved from the countryside to the
city in the face of sizeable urban pools of unemployed and underemployed. To accomplish this, the model
focused attention on the present value of expected earnings rather than current wage rates. The rate of
rural-urban migration was held to be a function of the di¤erence between the present values of expected
urban earnings and expected rural earnings. The model of Todaro shows that, in certain parametric ranges,
an increase in urban employment may actually result in higher levels of urban unemployment and even
reduced national product (i.e. the Todaro Paradox ).
In our model we assume that there is not unemployment neither among residents neither among mi-
grants, but some of them can be employed in job requiring fewer skills that they have. This conclusion
is analogous to the conclusion obtained from the Harris-Todaro model which foresees, urban overcrowding
due to high rates of migration from rural areas to cities and high informal sector employment as a fact of life
in many low and middle income countries. Today is useful to see informal employment in many European
cities, as result of migration coming from non-EU countries. We consider that the ux of migrantes, is not
the only the consequence of the expected di¤erential wages, but also of the consequence of imitation.
Following the model by Accinelli-Carrera-Punzo (2008), let us consider that in the rst stage the election
of each worker is the result of a normal form game between rms and workers. Specically, we consider
two countries A and B where there exists two types of rms: innovative (I) and non-innovative (NI) an
two types of workers skilled (s) and unskilled (us). We consider that:
 In both countries, non-innovative rms pay the same salaries for both kind of workers, this salary
is symbolized by Y j(NI;s) = Y
j
(NI;us) = Y
j
(us) > 0. But innovative rms pay higher salaries to skilled
workers, i.e. Y j(I;s) > Y
j
(I;us) = Y
j
(NI;us) = Y
j
(NI;s), 8 j 2 fA;Bg.
 To remain as a skilled worker there is a xed training cost denoted by cjs > 0, in each country
j 2 fA;Bg.
 When a skilled worker from country A decides to migrates to country B, she may be engaged by a
non-innovative rm or by an innovative rm. Then, the expected earning of a skilled worker in time
t is given by:
Ejs(t) = p
j
I(t)Y
j
(I;s)(t) + p
j
NI(t)Y
j
(NI;s)   cjs(t); 8 j 2 fA;Bg: (1)
where pjI is the probability to be engaged by innovative rm, and p
j
NI by non-innovative rm. Since
we assume that there is not unemployment then, pjI + p
j
NI = 1 and more specically they are equal
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to the percentage of innovative and non-innovative rms in each country j. The expected earning of
a unskilled worker from country j 2 fA;Bg is given by:
Ejus = Y
j
I;ns = Y
j
(NI;us) = Y
j
(us): (2)
Note that primarily, the decision to be skilled or unskilled in each country depends on: i) the di¤erential
of salaries, ii) the percentage of innovative rms and iii) the training costs or education costs.
In the next stage, workers must choose between either to migrate or do not migrate. Preferences play
an important part in determining behavior. If they have preferences for migration, then the individuals
decision to migrate from country A (home) to country B (foreign country) depends on two main variables:
i) the expected income di¤erences between countries and ii) the migration costs. Hence:
 For a representative skilled worker this value is given by:
Vs(t0) =
Z tf
t0
[EBs (t)  EAs (t)]e rtdt  CBA(0) (3)
where Vs(t0) is the discounted present value of the net gain from migration for a skilled worker. The
interval [t0; tf ] is the planning horizon, CAB(0) > 0 denotes the cost to emigrate from country A to
country B. In cases where Vs(0) is positive, the (rational) potential migrant will decide to move from
country A to country B, otherwise she does not migrate.
 Analogously for a representative unskilled worker:
Vus(t0) =
Z tf
t0
[Y Bus(t)  Y Aus(t)]e rtdt  CBA(0) (4)
the decision to migrate is according with the sign of the discounted present value of the net gain from
migration.
4
The above considerations are summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Extensive form representation of the migration
(two stage) game.
So, in the rst stage a worker, w, should decide whether to become a skilled worker or not, i.e. in time
t = t 1 a worker in a given country j chooses a pure strategy from the set S = fs; nsg. Assuming that
the distribution of rms is well know, the workerselection depends on the expected payo¤s Ejs and E
j
ns
as was dened above (equations (1)-(2)). In the second stage, such a worker decides whether to migrate
or not depending on his/her discounted present value of the net gain from migration (equations (3)-(??)
according with the sign of V js (t0) if the worker is skilled or according with the sign of V
j
ns(t0) for unskilled
worker) which are the nal payo¤s.
Notice that we can state the normal form game representation between rms and workers. The payo¤
matrix of this game is given by:
Firm
Worker I NI
s Y j(s; I); j(I; s) Y j(us;NI); j(I; s)
us Y j(us; I); j(I; us) Y j(us;NI); j(NI; us)
(5)
where by Y j(h; k) we symbolize the salary of a worker of type h 2 fs; usg engaged by a rm of type
k 2 fI;NIg in country j 2 fA;Bg and by j(k; h) we symbolize the k rm prot when hiring a h worker.
We consider that:
 Y j(s; I) > Y j(us; I) = Y j(us;NI) = Y j(s;NI):
 j(I; s) > j(I; us) = j(NI; s) = j(NI; ns):
While the decision to be skilled or not depends on the rms distribution of the own country and on the
rmsdistribution in the host country. So, this two stage-game can be played if and only if workers have
complete information about the distribution of the rms in each country.
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3 The dynamics with complete information
In the framework of Harris-Todaro analysis, the potential migrant weighed the benets of migration in
terms of future discounted expected earnings in the urban sector against the costs of migration which were
the foregone wages in the rural sector and the direct costs of migration. In this section we extend this
model to the case of migration between countries.
Assuming that workers know the probability to be hired by an innovative rm, consider that on time
t = t0   1 workers in each country need to choose between to be skilled or unskilled, after that in time
t = t0 the skilled and unskilled workers choose between to migrate or or not to do it.
Let n = (nAs ; n
A
us; n
B
s ; n
B
us) be the distribution of workers between countries and types n
A
s + n
A
us + n
B
s +
nBus = 1 and n
j
h  0. This means that n represents a distribution over countries and strategies, n 2 . We
assume that the size of the population is constant along the time.
Suppose that in time t the percentage of skilled workers in country j 2 fA;Bg is given by njs(t) and
the percentage of unskilled is given by njus(t): The percentage of innovative rms in time t in country j is
given by pji (t) and the percentage of no innovative rms is p
j
ni(t):
We assume that the decision to migrate is irrevocable at least for a time interval, so to make the decision
on it a worker considers the expected gains in a signicant time interval. Hence, the workers population
dynamics, in each country j 2 fA;Bg can be summarized, using the replicator dynamics.1 This dynamics
is given by the following di¤erential equation system,
_njs =
 
(Ejs(t)  Y jns(t)
  V js (t)njs ; (6)
In other words, the proportion of workers using strategy s increases (decreases) if its payo¤ is bigger
(smaller) than the average payo¤ of the migrant population. Where according with (1) Ejs(t) denotes the
expected payo¤ of a skilled worker in country j at time t; Yns(t) denotes the wage of an unskilled worker
and V js (t) denotes the expected gains of migration. Note that the best pure responses to the current
population state njs have the highest growth rate in the population, the second-best pure responses have
the second-highest growth rate, and so on.2
This dynamic is valid if workers know the distribution of the rms and the cost of migration. However,
these distributions may not be well known by workers. Then an alternative mechanism that with propose
in this paper is namely an imitation process. Each worker under incomplete information look to his social
network, and take his decision according with a rule supported on imitation.3
Note that the number of skilled workers in country j increases if [(Ejs(t)   Y jns(t))   V js (t)] > 0. This
fact raises the productivity of the country, nevertheless if the number of immigrants is increasing, labor
competition as well as higher alienation among immigrants inside the community may reduce their net
benets, called negative network externalities.
1The replicator dynamics (RD) explicitly model a selection process, specifying how population shares associated with
di¤erent pure strategies in a game evolve over time. The mathematical formulation of the replicator dynamics is due to Taylor
and Jonker (1978). They imagine a large population of agents who are randomly matched over time to play a nite symmetric
two-player game, just as in the setting for evolutionary stability. However, here agents only play pure strategies.
2Although more successful pure strategies grow faster than less successful ones, the average payo¤ in the population need
not grow over time. The reason for this possibility is that if an agent is replaced by an agent using a better strategy, then the
opponents meeting this new agent may receive lower payo¤s.
3Behavioral rules driven by imitation have a long tradition in the literature of evolutionary game theory. One of the best
known evolutionary models, the replicator dynamics, describes an evolutionary process which is driven purely by imitation of
other as (see Weibull, 1995).
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4 The workersimitative behavior
Consider now that workers have incomplete information about the real distributions of the rms. In this
case, before to adopt any decision about their own behavior, each worker needs to choose a mechanism
according to which to make such a choice. In this section we introduce imitation as an impulsive force to
take decisions in the individual behavior, since workers migrate if the others do it.
We say that a worker is a reviewer agent, if in a given time t 2 [0;1) she makes to herself the question
about whether it is better to continue and remain with the previous behavior or better to change from it.
So, a reviewer skilled worker makes to himself the question for the next period about to continue being a
skilled one or he becomes an unskilled one, i.e. being or not so longer being in the knowledge frontier.
We assume that to be a skilled worker in the next period has a cost of education (or training cost)
cs(t) > 0. If a worker does not pay this cost, then he becomes unskilled. An unskilled worker becomes
skilled if he pays the cost of education otherwise he remains as unskilled one.
The probability that a reviewer worker (i.e. the worker who already makes to himself the question about
his current behavior) depends on the performance of the current behavior (strategy). Let wh(t) 2 [0; 1] be
the probability that a worker of type h 2 fs; usg becomes a reviewer, i.e. the probability for raising the
question about to change or not behavior.
Then, a reviewer changes or not his actual strategy under the probability P (k=h)(t) 2 [0; 1] which
denotes that a worker of type h becomes k; h; k 2 fs; usg: If h = k then the reviewer maintains his previous
behavior. So, the probability that a worker of type h becomes a worker of type k is given by:
P (h! k)(t) = wh(t)P (k=h):
Suppose that a reviewer worker considers that to behave as the majority is doing is the right thing to
do. So, such a reviewer wrokers imitates the behavior of the rst individual mached from his neighborhod
or social network. Assuming that the social network of each worker is the total population of workers of
his birth country, then the probability to meet a skilled worker in time t is simply njs(t) and n
j
us(t) is the
probability to meet an unskilled worker. Hence:
P j(h! k)(t) = wh(t)njh 2 [0; 1] :
In the same sense, if a worker need to choose between to migrate or does not, the existence of uncertainty
in the distribution of the rms in the foreign country, makes the individual must appeal to other alternatives
to make this decision. For instance, between the forces a¤ecting this decision the actual literature focusses
on family decisions. These family decisions are considered as a main factor to understand the individual
migration decisions, see for instance Bhattacharyya, B (1993). In our work we consider imitation as an
important factor in making this decision.
Looking the behavior of the most individuals of their social networks, each worker is able to construct a
preliminary draft of the set of prevailing wages in the foreign countries and the possibilities to be engaged
by a innovative or non-innovative rm. If most people make the decision to migrate, the probability that
a given individual believes that migration is a good choice will be high.
Then make sense to argue that a reviewer worker will follow the rule consisting in imitating the behavior
of the rst individual of his own type, s or us, that he met. In this case the probability that a reviewer
worker migrates, pjh(m), is proportional to the proportion n
j
mh of workers type h 2 fs; usg wishing to
migrate in country j:
If there are not so enough individuals who like migration, there will be no person who chose to migrate
by imitation. Certainly, we need to distinguish between people in favor of migration but no leave, people
such that never makes to himself the question about if to migrate or does not and people that even being
reviewer decides does not migrate. Let h be the probability that a reviewer of type h in favor of migrates
decide to do so.
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So, the probability that a worker of type h 2 fs; usg of country j 2 fA;Bg in time t decides to migrate
is given by:
P j(m=h)(t) = w
j
h(t)n
j
hm(t)
j
h(t) 2 [0; 1] : (7)
where wjh(t) is the probability that a worker of type h makes to himself the question about if he migrates
or does not migrate. This probability decrease with the current performance of his actual strategy. Finally
jh(t) is the probability that a reviewer in favor of migration do so. Then p
j(m=h)(t) = njhm(t)
j
h(t):
This idea contrasts with the usual approach that attributes migration to economic and social variables
such as wage di¤erentials, risk aversion, and relative deprivation, we include preferences of the workers
populations and imitation like a social phenomena.
Certainly, the probability that a worker becomes a reviewer who migrates or does not, depends inversely
with the performance of the economy of his birth country. We assume that the probability, jh(t), that a
worker willing to emigrate to do so, e¤ectively increases as expected that the wage gap between the two
countries is growing. Therefore we can remark that:
Remark 1 The decision to migrate depends on preferences and preferences are heterogeneous. The pattern
of migration as an outcome of a preference for migration which depends on two key factors: imitation and
migration feasibility. These factors jointly determine the outcome of a preference for migration.
Hence we argue that preference for migration are transmitted by imitation.
4.1 Imitation dynamics of the migration game
In the economic literature, the main variable that a¤ects the migrationdecisions is the wage di¤erential
between the host country and the country of birth. However in an alternative approach of Todaros
model, Moretti (1999) pointed out evidence that both the timing and the destination of migration could be
explained by the presence of social networks in the host country. In this section we consider imitation and
preferences as important factors to understand migration. The approach from evolutionary game theory
and evolutionary dynamics o¤er a suitable framework to introduce these two factors in the model (see for
instance Weibull, 1995).
Consider that in a nite population of workers, the review times of a h strategist, h 2 fs; usg in
a country j 2 fA;Bg is given by a Poisson process with arrival rate: wjh: Assuming that all agents
Poisson processes are statistically independent the aggregate of reviewing times in the subpopulation of
h strategists of country j; is itself a Poisson process with arrival tare wjhnjh: Assuming that at each arrival
times, each h strategist agent selects a pure strategy according with the distribution pj(k=h) k; h 2 fs; usg
and selects to migrate with probability pj(m=h); then the arrival rate of aggregate Poisson process of
switches to strategy h in country j is: njhw
j
hp(h=k); k 6= h 2 fs; usg:
We now imagine a continuum of agent and, by the law of large numbers, model these aggregate stochastic
process as deterministic ow.
 The inow to subpopulation h of country j is given by
 njkwjkpj(h=k) + [nihwihpi(m=i)
 The outow from subpopulation h of country j is given by
 [njhwjhpj(k=h) + njhwjhpj(m=h):
 Rearranging terms, we obtain
_njh = n
j
kw
j
kp
j(h=k)  njhwjhpj(k=h)] + [nihwihpi(m=h)  njhwjhpj(m=h)];
j 6= k 2 fA;Bg; and h 6= i 2 fs; usg:
(8)
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Assume that all reviewing agent adopt the strategy of the rst individual that they meet. Formally, for
all population states nj = (njs; n
j
usg 2 ; j 2 fA;Bg :
pj(h=k) = njh and p
j(m=h) = njmh
Under this assumption the population dynamics (8) becomes:
_njh = n
j
kn
j
h[w
j
k   wjh] + [nihwihnimhih   njhwjhnjmhjh];
j 6= k 2 fA;Bg; and h 6= i 2 fs; usg:
(9)
Suppose now that agents with less successful strategies on average review their strategy at a higher rate
than agents with more successful strategies, more precisely that:
wjh = h   hEjh (10)
;  2 R : 1 >   0;  > 0 and 1   maxt2[t0;tf ]

maxfEAh (t); EBh (t)g
	
: Then the population dynamics
(9) becomes:
_njh = n
j
kn
j
h[E
j
k   Ejh] + [nih(h   hEih)nimhih   njh(h   hEjh)njmhjh];
j 6= k 2 fA;Bg; and h 6= i 2 fs; usg:
(11)
Assuming now that the proportion of individuals in country i with a propensity to migrate increases
with the di¤erence Ejh Eih if this di¤erence is positive and is equal to zero if the di¤erence is negative, i.e:
mimh =
8<: ah(E
j
h   Eih) if (Ejh   Eih) > 0
0 in other case
where ah : 1=ah  maxt2[t0;tf ](Ejh(t)  Eji (t))
Considering the particular case where: ih = 
j
h = h and (E
j
h   Eih) > 0 it follows that nimh =
ah(E
j
h   Eih) and njmh = 0
Substituting in equation (11) we obtain:
_njh = n
j
kn
j
h[E
j
k   Ejh] + [nih(h   hEih)nimhih
Equivalently:
_njh = n
i
h[h   hEih]ah[Ejh   Eih] + njknjh[Ejk   Ejh] (12)
Note that since we are considering the case where (Ejh   Eih) > 0 then nihm = 0 so,
_nih = n
i
kn
i
h[E
i
k   Eih]
The evolution of subpopulation h 2 fs; usg when Ejh   Eih > 0 in country i and country j is given by
the system of di¤erential equations
_njh = n
i
h[h   hEih]ah[Ejh   Eih] + njknjh[Ejk   Ejh]
_nih = n
i
kn
i
h[E
i
k   Eih]
(13)
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Analogously we can obtain the evolution of the sub-populations k in countries A and B
Note that if the expected value of prots from the earnings of skilled workers at home is higher than the
expected value of prots abroad, then the inux of these workers will be zero, i.e: EBs  EAs symbolizing
home by B and the foreign country by B; or equivalently:
pAI (t)Y
A
Is + p
A
NIY
A
NIs   cAs > pBI (t)Y AIs + pBNIY BNIs   cBs ;
Assuming that salaries, and cost of education are given this condition can be expressed by the inequality:
pAI (t) >
Y AIs   Y BNIs
Y AIs   Y ANIs
pBI (t) +
(Y ANIs + Y
B
NIs) + (c
A
s   cBs )
Y AIs   Y ANIs
(14)
this condition is shown in Figure 2, where where tan = Y
A
Is Y BNIs
Y AIs Y ANIs
and 0 =
(Y ANIs+Y
B
NIs)+(c
A
s  cBs )
Y AIs Y ANIs
.
Figure 2. Condition for migration of skilled workers.
Therefore we can state that:
Proposition 1 The value
PATI (t) =
Y AIs   Y BNIs
Y AIs   Y ANIs
pBI (t) +
(Y ANIs + Y
B
NIs) + (c
A
s   cBs )
Y AIs   Y ANIs
(15)
denotes a threshold value, such that if in time, t, PAI (t) > P
AT
I (t), then the migratory ux from country
B to country A in time t; is equal to zero. Certainly, as shown in Figure 2 this threshold value depends
on salaries, cost of education and percentage of innovative rms in country A. To overcome this threshold
value, country A needs a high percentage of innovative rms, as higher is for instance the cost of education
in country A; or lower it is in country B. Equivalently, a decrease in the cost of education in country B
may increase emigration from country A to B.
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As we already noted (see section 3) the migration of workers from country B to country A raises the
productivity of the country A, nevertheless, if the number of immigrants continues to increase, migration can
become a negative externality. Complementary this migration of skilled workers, makes lower productivity,
and hence welfare in the country of origin. Analyzing equation (14) we can conclude that regulation can
be of help to avoid this negative facts.
It follows that if PAI (t) > P
AT
I then the evolution of the sub-population of skilled workers in country A
will be given by the equation 2, in the system (13); i.e:
_nAs = n
A
usn
A
s [E
A
us   EAs ]
Analogously to the case of migration, we can introduce now elements of economic policy in order to
increase the population of skilled workers and the welfare of the country.
5 Prospectives for economic policy
A strategic approach for a policy of migration presupposes the implementation of legislative, administrative,
policy and infrastructural measures (including planning, information gathering and monitoring). However
in this section we focusses only in some comments inspired in the analysis of the index given by equation
(15). This index shows the inter-relationship between domestic and foreign economic policies to increase
or decrease the ow of migration between the countries involved,
If we look at equation (15) it follows that the threshold value to stop the migration, of skilled workers
from country A (home) to country B (foreign country) increase with the percentage of innovative rms
existing in B: However this fact can be countered increasing the salaries of skilled workers in home. Note
that this measure makes that the slope of the line that this index denes, decreases, making that the region
where the ow of migration from the country A to the country B is zero increases. In some sense, if the
opportunity cost to be skilled in country A given by cAs decreases, then the mentioned region increases
because the line that denes the threshold value moves in parallel down, see Figure 2.
Taking account that the percentage of skilled workers and innovative rms are complementary factors
to ensure the welfare of a given country, the policy makers can look to this index in the moment of choose
measure of economic policy with the objective to increase the technical develop of a given country.
5.1 Swedish emigration to the United States: An early example
In this section, to show how the combination of several push factor and pull factor, determine the evolution
of migratory ux, we o¤er some comments about the migration process from Swedish to USA, at the
beginning of the XX century. The increasing of preferences from migration at that time was the result of
a process of "imitation of the behavior from neighboring."
Like many European nations, Sweden experiences since the mid-eighteenth century to the 1930 mass
migration to the United States. The combination of push factors in Europe and pull factors in the United
States explains the causes of European migration, Ljungmark (1979). The push factors that characterize
the Swedish emigration are: i) overpopulation resulted from improved health, better food and a prolonged
period of peace, ii) religious intolerance of the time contrasted with religious freedom o¤ered by the new
land iii) social class di¤erences, and iv) migration o¤ering out of poverty and unemployment among large
social Ljungmark, (1992). At the same time, the pull factors identied are: i) the most important pull
factor was the possibility of obtaining land for farming, Ljungmark (1992). This author emphasizes that
theHomestead Actgave certain economic benets immigrants.This legislation o¤ered 160 acres of free
land to any American citizen of legal age or any immigrant, who had notied the government of this decision
to become a citize, and ii) United States o¤ered an expanding labor market and a good wage. This pull
factor was perhaps the most important since 1890, Ljungmark (1992).
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It is important to add that the reason which accelerates Swedish emigration in mid-1800 is the fact
that until 1840 emigration policies prevented citizens seeks their fortune in other nations. Much of this
emigration policies were abolished at the beginning of 1840 due to population growth, mass poverty and
liberal ideas on the economy that, among other things, postulated the right of the individual to govern
their own lives, Kälvemark (1976).
Table 1 shows that a total of 1,122,292 Swedes immigrated to the United States during the period
1851 -1930. Added to this is estimated at about 100 000 people emigrated population not recorded by
o¢ cial statistics, and nearly 200 000 people have returned to Sweden before 1930. Therefore, the Swedish
population decreases during the period mentioned in more than one million people, Carlsson (1976). To
give perspective to these gures, in 1930 Swedens population was 6,142,191 people (SCB, 1969), that is,
to date almost one fth of the population had emigrated.4
Table 1. Registered Emigration from
Sweden to America, 1851-1930.
Period emigrants
1851-1860* 14.865
1861-1870 88.731
1871-1880 101.169
1881-1890 324.285
1891-1900 200.524
1901-1910 219.249
1911-1920 81.537
1921-1930 91.932
Total 1,122.292
The rst wave of mass emigration was composed mainly by small farmers and agricultural workers
who left behind small holdings and farms. At the same time, the United States o¤ered the opportunity
to acquire a large amount of surface to very reasonable price. Under these circumstances advantageous,
the low investment required migrating and the low opportunity cost increases the incentive to emigration.
Regarding the migration decision-making is interesting to note two observations. First, the Swedish im-
migrant took his decision to emigrate despite the lack of information then actually in the United States.
In this sense, the case of Swedish emigration coincides with the migration model Harris-Todaro, i.e. the
expected income plays a central role when making the decision to emigrate. Or even correspond to an
imitation process of the neighbor. This is particularly clear taking account that the frequency of migration
depends on the social sector to which individuals belonged, this is our next observation.
The frequency of migrants from the upper classes was signicantly lower compared to low-income sectors,
Carlsson (1976). No doubt that for the upper class migration had a high opportunity cost thus providing
a low probability of improving the level of income earned in the local labor market.
The expansion and conquest of the American West meant, among other things, reducing the supply
of land at low prices. This meant that the migration of small farmers was reduced. Thus, since 1891 the
majority of Swedish immigrants settled in cities. The occupational prole of migrants changed to industrial
trades, Ljungmark (1992). Thus, among the occupations of migrants is noted for example, farm hands,
servants, apprentices, blacksmiths, wood workers, mill workers, shoemakers, tailors and seamstresses. The
aim of these emigrants was not investing in agriculture but also secure employment in the urban labor
market. In other words, it was labor migration in which expectations of higher wages was the main reason
to take the individual decision to migrate.
4Source: Carlsson, Sten (1979). * Period 1851-1880 includes people who have emigrated to Canada.
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6 Concluding remarks
As it is widely accepted the economic e¤ects of migration vary widely. The asymmetric economic inter-
ests of migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries in the debate over the optimaldesign of labor
immigration policy are well known. However, spite that the migration of skilled workers from country B
to country A raises the productivity of this country, if the number of immigrants continues to increase,
can become a negative externality, for the host country. Sending countries may experience both gains and
losses in the short term. For receiving countries, some temporary programs may help to address skills
shortages but may decrease domestic wages and add to public welfare burden. For sending countries, the
short-term economic benet of emigration is found in remittances. According to the World Bank, remit-
tances worldwide were estimated at 414 billion in 2009, a decrease of six percent from 2008. However the
migration of skilled workers plays a negative role in the welfare of the sending country. The low number of
skilled workers make that the country can not to use the advanced technology, loosing in competitiveness
and then economic welfare. Contrarily the host country can be beneted by the arrival of skilled workers
can be quickly inserted in high tech production processes.
Researchers argue that the net e¤ects of migration are generally positive. The Economist magazine,
for example, claimed that loosening restrictions on labor migration "would be one of the fastest ways to
boost global economic growth." The positive e¤ects, they say, would be signicantly greater than removal
of any trade barriers. For example, Somaliland, a breakaway region of conict-devastated Somalia, receives
an estimated 500 million a year in money sent home from abroad, four times more than the income from
the main export, livestock, according to a study by the researcher Ismail Ahmed reported in the Financial
Times. In the case of Mexico, remittances have become the countrys second most important source of
foreign exchange, after oil. The income is so large that Mexicans working outside of the country were able
to gain the right to vote after threatening to withhold remittances. This gure though only takes into
account funds sent by formal channels, so the number is much larger.
An overestimation of the di¤erence between expected wages abroad and at home, can lead to a migration
ow greater than the optimum, resulting in a loss of welfare in the host country. This process can be
maintained even when wages are decreasing in the host country, if the di¤erences between these expected
values remain high. In this case he probability that a reviewer to imitate the migrant behavior may be
higher than the probability to imitate the contrary behavior. This fact is clearly seen in many European
countries where the expectations of particular benet to lower-skilled workers is higher, even when they
are decreasing, than the expected wages for this type of worker at home. Complementary with this fact,
in countries where migration originates skilled workers, sending-countries lose the ability to use high-
technology, falling back in their development and economic welfare. Regulation policies in sending and
receiving countries can help to obtain an optimal solution.
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